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Privacy Regulations Coordinator
California Office of the Attorney General
300 South Spring Street, First Floor
Los Angeles, CA 90013
By email: PrivacyRegulations@doj.ca.gov
I am a tenured law professor at Santa Clara University School of Law, where I teach Internet
Law. I submit these comments on the “proposed text of regulations” (the “regulations”)
published by the California Department of Justice (DOJ) on October 11, 2019. These comments
represent only my views and not the views of my employer or any third party.
The “Average” Consumer
Echoing California Civil Code 1798.185(a)(5), the regulations use the term “average consumer”
five times (999.305(a)(2), 999.306(a)(2), 999.307(a)(2), 999.308(a)(2), and 999.315(b)).
However, the term “average consumer” isn’t defined.
The “average consumer” standard does not represent the prevailing national approach in
consumer protection law. The FTC expressly considered the appropriate standard for measuring
consumer confusion in its 1983 Policy Statement on Deception. In that statement, the FTC
adopted the standard of “a consumer acting reasonably in the circumstances.” This standard has
served consumers and the FTC well for over three decades. Among other advantages, it avoids
the indeterminacy of defining what constitutes an “average” consumer when a business caters to
multiple heterogeneous consumer segments. The DOJ should define the term “average
consumer” to track the FTC’s reasonable consumer standard.
999.301(s) defines a “typical consumer,” but its definition does not acknowledge either the
“average” or “reasonable” consumer standard. The “typical consumer” definition should be
harmonized with the “average consumer” definition and, like “average consumer,” should reflect
the FTC’s “reasonable consumer” standard.

Exceptions to Requests to Know
999.313(c)(4) provides a list of items that pose too great a privacy/security risk if disclosed in
response to a bogus request to know. The DOJ should consider expanding the list of
undisclosable items that pose a heightened security risk.
Verifiable Consumer Requests and Rules vs. Standards
The legal requirements for verifiable consumer requests play a critical role in the CCPA.
Businesses are legally required to honor verifiable consumer requests, but illegitimate requests
can lead to major security violations that severely harm targeted victims. The regulations create
legal liability for businesses in both directions: they face liability for dishonoring valid requests
and liability for honoring some invalid requests. Because every consumer request creates
potential legal exposure, businesses frequently will feel compelled to route consumer requests
through customized legal review at substantial expense.
The DOJ can ameliorate the need for these expensive individualized determinations by providing
concrete and specific bright-line rules of exactly what constitutes a verifiable consumer request,
instead of requiring businesses to conduct fact-intensive, potentially irresolute, and expensive
evaluations of legal “standards,” such as requiring “reasonable” behavior or balancing multifactor tests.
The regulations for verifiable consumer requests represent a mix of rules and standards. The
portions that are “rules” are helpful. For example, 999.325(b) and (c) provide bright-line rules
for when businesses must disclose categories and specific pieces of personal information
(indeed, these bright-line rules ought to apply to all consumer requests). Business’ ability to rely
on password authentication is another helpful rule.
Elsewhere, the regulations adopt legal standards that will create substantial dilemmas for
businesses trying to do the right thing. Most conspicuously, 999.323(b)(3) requires businesses to
navigate a multi-factor test when evaluating consumer requests. The commentary in the Initial
Statement of Reasons reinforces the imperative to get it right; the commentary says that
“businesses have the responsibility to establish a reasonable method for verifying the identity of
the person making the request.”
999.323(b)(3)’s multi-factor test creates many scenarios where well-meaning businesses won’t
be sure what is the right decision. Further, those circumstances lend themselves to secondguessing by the DOJ. These dynamics will cause businesses to over-spend on these decisions.
Thus, as a general proposition, with respect to what constitutes a “verifiable consumer request,”
the DOJ should rely less on multi-factor tests and rely more on bright line rules.
Alternatively, the DOJ can provide more bright-line safe harbors, such as those in 999.325(b)
and (c). As just one example, the DOJ could add a safe harbor for businesses that rely on an
opinion of counsel about the reasonableness of their actions. However, opinions of counsel are
expensive. Other safe harbors that businesses could implement at lower cost would benefit
everyone.
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Two other places where the DOJ imposes standards that should be converted to bright-line rules
or subject to bright-line safe harbors:




999.313(c)(3) says that businesses should not honor a consumer request when disclosure
creates a “substantial, articulable, and unreasonable” security risk. All three adjectives are
standards, not rules, and they require substantial (and expensive) expertise and judgment
to implement properly.
999.325(b) and (c) require businesses to verify a consumer’s identity with a “reasonable”
and “reasonably high” degree of certainty. 999.325(d) then requires businesses to
determine the applicable level of scrutiny “in good faith.” While many businesses will act
in good faith, the indeterminacy of the “good faith” standard and fear of DOJ secondguessing will cause businesses to spend time and money preparing unnecessary
documentation validating the good faith of their decision.

Note: 999.325(a) makes a cross-reference to a subsection (g) that does not exist.
999.325(b) requires some consumer requests to be made under “penalty of perjury.” In theory,
this encourages submitters to submit only valid requests. However, will the DOJ devote any
resources to prosecuting any perjured declarations? If not, the perjury declaration requirement
will not adequately deter bogus requests. We’ve seen a similar dynamic with 17 U.S.C. §
512(c)(3), which specified the elements of proper copyright takedown notices. Per 17 U.S.C. §
512(c)(3)(A)(vi), the takedown notice sender must declare under penalty of perjury that he or she
is the copyright owner or its authorized representative. However, in the two decades since the
law’s enactment, I am not aware of any perjury prosecutions for misdeclarations. Perhaps not
surprisingly, bogus copyright takedown notices are rampant. E.g., Jennifer Urban et al, Notice
and Takedown in Everyday Practice, Mar. 22, 2017,
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2755628. If the DOJ expects the “penalty of
perjury” declaration to discourage bogus consumer requests, it will need to commit resources to
enforcement.
Rejecting Deletion Requests
999.313(d)(1) says that an unverifiable request to delete shall be treated as a request to opt-out of
data sales. However, like other unverifiable consumer requests, the only proper outcome should
be to disregard it. Otherwise, unrelated third parties—including malicious actors—can disrupt a
consumer’s relationship with a business.
999.315(h) does not adequately mitigate this problem. A business can dishonor any request that
it “has a good-faith, reasonable, and documented belief” is fraudulent. Unfortunately, there is a
significant gap between dubious unverified requests and obviously fraudulent requests, even
though dubious unverified requests may be pernicious. Due to 999.315(h)’s high legal standards
and 999.313(d)(1)’s low legal standards, businesses will feel pressured to treat requests in that
gap as opt-out requests even when pernicious to the victim.
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The regulations could fix this by lowering the 999.315(h) standard or raising the 999.313(d)(1)
standard. The better approach would be to scrap the concept entirely. The DOJ has assumed,
without any supporting empirical evidence, that deletion requests are perfectly correlated with
consumers’ desire to opt-out of data sales. Unless and until the DOJ validates this assumption,
the DOJ should not codify it.
Applying Deletion Requests to Archival Information
999.313(d)(3) says that businesses must process deletion requests on archival material upon its
access or use. How will this work in practice? If a business wants to consult archival material for
any reason, including for reasons that will never involve the data of consumers who have made
deletion requests, the business must first process all prior deletion requests before doing anything
else. This could add substantial and problematic time delays and expense to any attempts to
access archival materials. Instead, the regulations should require businesses to process past
deletion requests on archival materials only when the business’ engagement with the archival
materials relates to such consumers or when the business is converting archival materials into
active usage.
“User-Enabled Privacy Controls”
999.315(a) and (c) require businesses to honor opt-out signals communicated by “user-enabled
privacy controls,” an undefined term. Unfortunately, this proposal misunderstands the
technology in two key ways.
First, though most consumers use one of only a few browser software programs, there are dozens
or hundreds of other browser software programs in use, and new versions are constantly issued.
Further, each software program independently decides how to indicate user preferences.
Businesses cannot easily keep abreast of the complete universe of browsers and their
idiosyncratic indications of consumer intent. Plus, honoring any new or changed browser signal
takes time and money; it can’t be implemented instantly.
Second, the browser software programs may ambiguously indicate consumer intent. The
programs may give consumers a range of options, not just a binary yes/no to data sales. Or the
program’s way of characterizing its options to consumers may not clearly specify that it governs
data sales, or the option may cover multiple unrelated topics.
Because the “user-enabled privacy controls” concept involves too much speculation about how
browser software programs work, it’s premature for the DOJ to adopt it. If the DOJ nevertheless
retains the concept, it should (1) precisely define “user-enabled privacy controls,” (2) implement
a formal certification process run by the DOJ (or DOJ-approved third party certification bodies)
to validate which precise versions of browser software programs contain a “user-enabled privacy
control” that unambiguously indicates its users’ opt-out desires, (3) specify the technological
details of each certified program so that businesses can accurately recognize and interpret the
program’s signals, and (4) provide a phase-in window for businesses to implement any newly
certified programs.
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Transparency Reports
999.317(g) creates a new obligation for bigger businesses to disclose various statistics about
consumer requests. Disclosures like these are sometimes called “transparency reports.”
In general, I support transparency efforts. Transparency can encourage businesses to improve
their behavior (because “what gets measured gets done”) and provide helpful data to researchers
and government enforcers to identify problems with the existing laws and advocate for reform.
Unfortunately, I do not see how the regulation’s transparency report obligations will advance
those goals. The regulations aren’t likely to improve business behavior (businesses are already
obligated to comply with the law), nor is it clear who plans to mine the disclosed data and how
the required disclosures will be helpful to them. Meanwhile, the transparency report obligations
impose substantial additional expenses on businesses. The fact that larger businesses might have
better financial capacity to bear the costs doesn’t obviate the need for cost/benefit justification.
The DOJ should eliminate the transparency report requirement from this version of the
regulations and possibly reconsider it in future drafts when it’s clearer who plans to use the
transparency reports and exactly what information those users need. If the DOJ nevertheless
retains the requirement, it should include a phase-in requirement for businesses that newly cross
the 4 million consumer threshold.
“Aggregate Household Information”
The DOJ should define the phrase “aggregate household information” as used in 999.318(a).
Non-Discrimination Provisions
Example 2 (999.336(c)(2)) did not make sense. How can a business keep providing price
discounts to a consumer who deletes their identifying information?
Also, while the options in 999.337(b) are helpful, the validation requirements remain onerous
overall. Many businesses, especially smaller businesses, lack precise data to take advantage of
any of the options.
A GDPR Safe Harbor
In its Notice of Proposed Rulemaking Action, the DOJ indicates:
A less stringent regulatory alternative would, among other things, allow limited
exemption for GDPR-compliant firms. Limitations would be specific to areas where
GDPR and CCPA conform in both standards and enforcement, subject to auditing as
needed. This approach could achieve significant economies of scale in both private
compliance and public regulatory costs. The Attorney General rejects this regulatory
alternative because of key differences between the GDPR and CCPA, especially in terms
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of how personal information is defined and the consumer’s right to opt-out of the sale of
personal information (which is not required in the GDPR).
The GDPR offers many protections for California consumers that the CCPA does not. Thus, it’s
likely that if consumers actually understood both laws, many California consumers would regard
the GDPR as equal or superior to the CCPA at protecting their interests. Meanwhile, everyone—
including consumers—would benefit from the “significant economies of scale” and associated
cost reductions that would come from a GDPR-compliance safe harbor to the CCPA.
What’s Missing
The following two suggestions, related to the definition of “business” in California Civil Code
1798.140(c)(1), would help reduce unnecessary compliance costs.
First, the regulations should specify that the DOJ will only enforce the CCPA against businesses
that generate $25M revenue in California. As currently drafted, the law requires full compliance
from out-of-state businesses that have $25M in global revenue and “do business in California” (a
notoriously ambiguous phrase) but derive minimal or no revenue from California residents.
Second, the regulations should provide a phase-in period for businesses that cross the CCPA’s
quantitative thresholds, such as a business approaching $25M in annual revenue. Right now, the
law functionally requires that business to implement the law before reaching the threshold so that
it will be in compliance if revenues actually cross the threshold. However, this means the CCPA
affects companies expressly outside its scope. To avoid this outcome, the regulations should
specify that CCPA compliance is only required 6 or 12 months after the business crosses the
applicable threshold. The same issue arises with the 50,000 consumer threshold in (c)(1)(B) and
the 50% threshold in (c)(1)(C).
Thank you for considering my comments.
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